A Less Perfect Union.

This is a daunting time, not only in terms of our public health and our economic health but also in terms of the health of the republic. It is an old theme that any form of popular government needs virtuous citizens if it is to survive. It also needs citizens to agree on what counts as a virtue. I fear that the pandemic has shown that "We, the people" do not agree, and this shows what we already knew, that there are profound cracks in our union.

Emerging viral threats and the simultaneity of the non-simultaneous: zooming out in times of Corona.

This paper addresses global bioethical challenges entailed in emerging viral diseases, focussing on their socio-cultural dimension and seeing them as symptomatic of the current era of globalisation. Emerging viral threats exemplify the extent to which humans evolved into a global species, with a pervasive and irreversible impact on the planetary ecosystem. To effectively address these disruptive threats, an attitude of preparedness seems called for, not only on the viroscientific, but also on bioethical, regulatory and governance levels. This paper analyses the global bioethical challenges of emerging viral threats from a dialectical materialist (Marxist) perspective, focussing on three collisions: (1) the collision of expanding networks of globalisation with local husbandry practices; (2) the collision of global networks of mobility with disrupted ecosystems; and (3) the collision of viroscience as a globalised research field with existing regulatory frameworks. These collisions emerge in a force field defined by the simultaneity of the non-simultaneous. Evidence-based health policies invoke discontent as they reflect the normative logic of a globalised knowledge regime. The development of a global bioethics or macro-ethics requires us to envision these collisions not primarily as issues of benefits and risks, but first and foremost as normative tensions closely entangled with broader socio-economic and socio-cultural developments.

Respect for individual autonomy and a collective benefit: Arguments in favor of compulsory SARS-CoV-2 vaccination among health care professionals. / Respeto por la autonomía individual y el beneficio colectivo: argumentación a favor de la vacunación obligatoria contra el SARS-CoV-2 para el personal de la salud.

With the development of SARS-CoV-2 vaccines, a new aspect to be taken into consideration in the midst of the pandemic is vaccine refusal. Since vaccination is voluntary, it is necessary to deal with the fact that some health care team members refuse to receive it. Here I put forward different bioethical arguments: Kantian deontology and the principles of universalizability, humanity, and autonomy; Mill's utilitarianism, with selfprotection as the sole end for which humankind is authorized to interfere with its members' freedom of action; Beauchamp and Childress' principlism and the concepts of beneficence and autonomy; Varo Baena's principle of opportunity; and the principle of solidarity resulting from the ethics of human rights. The contributions of contemporary philosophers like Roberto Espósito, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Alberto Giubilini are also included. Two counterarguments are presented: nonmaleficence and counter-production. Lastly, I suggest that, since common good (in this case, public health) is the intimate and final determining factor of individual freedom and is the same for all, it is above any individual benefit.

Con la llegada de las vacunas contra el SARSCoV- 2, un nuevo aspecto a tener en cuenta en la pandemia es el rechazo a la vacunación. Como la recepción de la vacuna, es voluntaria, se plantea cómo abordar la situación de los miembros del equipo de salud que la rechazan. Se exponen argumentos bioéticos de diversas corrientes: el deontologismo kantiano y lo conceptos de universalidad, humanidad y autonomía; el utilitarismo de Mill, con la autoprotección como único fin por el cual la humanidad está habilitada para interferir con la libertad de acción de sus miembros; el principismo de Beauchamp y Childress y los conceptos de beneficencia y autonomía; el principio de oportunidad de Varo Baena; y el principio de solidaridad, derivado de la ética de los derechos humanos. Se incluyen aportes de filósofos contemporáneos como Roberto Espósito, Jean-Luc Nancy y Alberto Giubilini. Se exponen dos contrargumentos: el de no maleficencia y el de contraproducencia. Por último, se plantea que, dado que el bien común (la salud pública, en este caso) es el determinante íntimo y último de la libertad individual e igual para todos, está por encima del beneficio individual.

Seeing clearly through COVID-19: current and future questions for the history and philosophy of the life sciences.

The role of a journal like HPLS during the novel coronavirus pandemic should serve as a means for scholars in different fields and professions to consider historically and critically what is happening as it unfolds. Surely it cannot tackle all the possible issues related to the pandemic, in particular to the COVID-19 pandemic, but it does have a responsibility to foster the best possible dialogue about the various issues related to the history and philosophy of the life sciences, and thus to solicit contributions from potential authors working in different parts of the world and belonging to different cultural traditions. Only a real plurality of perspectives should allow for a better, large-scale comprehension of what the COVID-19 pandemic is.

COVID-19 and the problem of clinical knowledge.

COVID-19 presents many challenges, both clinical and philosophical. In this paper we discuss a major lacuna that COVID-19 revealed in our philosophy and understanding of medicine. Whereas we have some understanding of how physician-scientists interrogate the world to learn more about medicine, we do not understand the epistemological costs and benefits of the various ways clinicians acquire new knowledge in their fields. We will also identify reasons this topic is important both when the world is facing a pandemic and when it is not.

The concept of disease in the time of COVID-19.

Philosophers of medicine have formulated different accounts of the concept of disease. Which concept of disease one assumes has implications for what conditions count as diseases and, by extension, who may be regarded as having a disease (disease judgements) and for who may be accorded the social privileges and personal responsibilities associated with being sick (sickness judgements). In this article, we consider an ideal diagnostic test for coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) infection with respect to four groups of people-positive and asymptomatic; positive and symptomatic; negative; and untested-and show how different concepts of disease impact on the disease and sickness judgements for these groups. The suggestion is that sickness judgements and social measures akin to those experienced during the current COVID-19 outbreak presuppose a concept of disease containing social (risk of) harm as a component. We indicate the problems that arise when adopting this kind of disease concept beyond a state of emergency.

Challenge Trials: What Are the Ethical Problems?

If, as is alleged, challenge trials of vaccines against COVID-19 are likely to save thousands of lives and vastly diminish the economic and social harms of the pandemic while subjecting volunteers to risks that are comparable to kidney donation, then it would seem that the only sensible objection to such trials would be to deny that they have low risks or can be expected to have immense benefits. This essay searches for a philosophical rationale for rejecting challenge trials while supposing that they have huge benefits and relatively low risks. Although it finds some force in objections to challenge trials grounded in the obligations of researchers to limit the harms imposed on some individuals for the benefit of others, it argues that there is no compelling objection to challenge trials of vaccines for COVID-19-if they have the benefits and risks that have been claimed.

Integrating philosophy, policy and practice to create a just and fair health service.

To practise 'fairly and justly' a clinician must balance the needs of both the many and the few: the individual patient in front of them, and the many unseen patients in the waiting room, and in the county. They must consider the immediate clinical needs of those in the present, and how their actions will impact on future patients. The good medical practice guidance 'Make the care of your patient your first concern' provides no guidance on how doctors should act when they care for multiple patients with conflicting needs. Moreover, conflicting needs extend far past simply those between different patients. At an organisational level, financial obligations must be balanced with clinical ones; the system must support those who work within it in a variety of roles; and, finally, in order for a healthcare service to be sustainable, the demands of current and future generations must be balanced.The central problem, we propose, is that there is no shared philosophical framework on which the provision of care or the development of health policy is based, nor is there a practical, fair and transparent process to ensure that the service is equipped to deal justly with new challenges as they emerge. Many philosophers have grappled with constructing a set of principles which would lead to a 'good' society which is just to different users; prominent among them is Rawls.Four important principles can be derived using a Rawlsian approach: equity of access, distributive justice, sustainability and openness. However, Rawls' approach is sometimes considered too abstract to be applied readily to policymaking; it does not provide clear guidance for how individuals working within existing institutions can enact the principles of justice. We therefore combine the principles derived from Rawls with Scanlonian contractualism: by demanding that decisions are made in a way which cannot be 'reasonably rejected' by different stakeholders (including 'trustees' for those who cannot represent themselves), we ensure that conflicting needs are considered robustly.We demonstrate how embedding this framework would ensure just policies and fair practice. We illustrate this by using examples of how it would help prevent injustice among different socioeconomic groups, prevent intergenerational injustice and prevent injustice in a crisis, for example, as we respond to new challenges such as COVID-19.Attempts to help individual doctors practise fairly and justly throughout their professional lives are best focused at an institutional or systemic level. We propose a practical framework: combining Scanlonian contractualism with a Rawlsian approach. Adopting this framework would equip the workforce and population to contribute to fair policymaking, and would ultimately result in a healthcare system whose practice and policies-at their core-were just.

Autonomy in HIV testing: a call for a rethink of personal autonomy in the HIV response in sub-Saharan Africa.

The author reviews various conceptions of autonomy to show that humans are actually not autonomous, strictly speaking. He argues for a need to rethink the personal autonomy approaches to HIV testing in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries. HIV/AIDS has remained a leading cause of disease burden in SSA. It is important to bring this disease burden under control, especially given the availability of current effective antiretroviral regimens in low- and middle-income countries. In most SSA countries the ethic or value of personal autonomy or self-determination is promoted as primary in HIV testing decision-making. SSA policymakers have an ontological and moral duty to adopt HIV testing policies that reflect human and medical realities, relationships, local contexts, and respect human rights for both individuals and others who are affected by HIV in society. Without rethinking the value of autonomy in HIV testing decision-making, the article cautions that attainment of the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 3 and the UNAIDS fast-track strategy that explicitly call to end the epidemic by 2030 will not be feasible for SSA.